SCSolar

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Everything posted by SCSolar

  1. http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/fslr/insider-trades
  2. How can that be? They had operational expenses of $345M in 2016 from continuing operations. They expect to ship 8.5-9GW. From their preliminary guidance, this is in the range of $3-$3.25B in revenue. Can they really reach 10-11% which is lower than 2016 Opex while shipping 30% more shipments?
  3. Looking at the cost per watt for acquisition is not a fair way to determine that First Solar projects are worse for an investment. The First Solar projects have a PPA based on the 2008 MPR. These lock in 20 year rates at PPA of $0.12 or less. The Roserock PPA from Recurrent is $0.045/KWhr with Austin Energy. There is twice as much revenue that is derived from the First Solar acquisition. Similar profits could be made from each per dollar invested. http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PUBLISHED/COMMENT_RESOLUTION/121158.htm http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/published/Comment_resolution/93316.htm http://www.utilitydive.com/news/austin-energy-gets-record-low-solar-bids-at-under-4-centskwh/401642/
  4. The sale price is what they paid for the projects in 2015.
  5. I am trying to wrap my hands around CAFD. Do you know what percentage of the CAFD is distributed to the tax equity partners(TEP) of the projects? The TEP get monthly and quarterly distributions that is distributed by the Sponsors operating the OpCo.
  6. What do they do with the CAFD? The Class A dividend is only a small portion of the total. Do they give the rest to the Parent or do they keep it for running the business?
  7. This is a solarzoom article that is along the lines of the digitaljournal article. http://www.solarzoom.com/article-94552-1.html
  8. Here is a link on discussions of small scale land lease for solar farms. This is anywhere between $1500 and $3,000 an acre per year. I live in a rural community with landowners having acreage and have received flyers quoting $2,000 per acre for 30 year leases looking for 30+ acres near major distribution centers. Cleared land in my area sells for $10,000-$15,000 per acre. https://www.reddit.com/r/RenewableEnergy/comments/1g9kgq/my_farm_was_approached_by_a_solar_power_company/?st=iu8s0ul0&sh=126f6d5a The purchase price from the earlier link is $18,250 per acre. A 10% return places the lease at $1825/acre. The total lease per MW based on 5 acre installation is $9125 per year. Depending on insolation, which for the areas of project are quite good, this would run about $0.005/Kwhr generated. Selling the land to free up $73M in cash is a good decisions imho.
  9. Those earnings estimates are not reflective of the current and future market. Looking at Q2, Jinko made $26M gross from projects and netted $42M as a company. Without power revenues earnings would be far less. This year the power revenues gross profit will be close to $95M on revenues of $160M with 60% gross margins. That places $1 in EPS from Jinkos module business this year. Most of that module profit is gone based on their Q3 guidance. Jinko indicated that the ASP is going to drop in the low teens. That drop is from a price of $0.55 and 18% margins in Q2. In Q3 the guidance based on Jinko's comments is $0.48 with 16% margins(midrange). This is $34-$35M lower gross profit that earnings is based on. Q2 had $42M net income. If the Q3 guidance happened in Q2, then after the reduced gross from the modules they would have had $7.5M net income in Q2. That would not be considered good at a stock price of $20. Heading into the winter, Jinko will have more curtailment and lower power generation numbers than summertime quarters. You can expect 30% less gross profit than Q2 from projects. This is $8M lower gross. You are now looking at Jinko being near break even in Q4. If past is prologue, do not expect a sudden uptick in ASP of any significance through 2017. One might expect a lower ASP in Q4 for those with major focus in the U.S. Yet another winter is hitting solars. It will be a milder winter than the last time and a shorter recovery time.
  10. What you call adjusting to market, some might call lying. Here are 5 examples of shift changing and corrections to both values and executions. What is interesting is that once Recurrent was bought, the guidelines for all other regions of what is perceived as better margin projects such as Japan and the China FIT have been pushed out and not met. There is a pattern of missing projections of project builds over and over and adjusting them out and dropping some that seemingly had approvals for building. As a company that once stated they only proceed with a project when a buyer is arranged, to be stating that they have projects and apparently not grid approval of clients is basically lying to the public. Lie number 1 - China projects March 15, Identified in the PR connecting 320W DC in China At the end of 2015 they had connected 196MW in China or 61% of guidance By the end of Q2 2016 the high FIT and they had 218MW r 68% of target 2015 connections Lie number 2 – Q2 Report China projects 338MW under developement- Note this was after the Recurrent acquisition. See Q2 2016 report for reality. Lie number 3 – Q2 Report 2015 japan 336MW of projects have grid connection approval. Q42015 ER indicates that 200MW have interconnection agreements. Lie Number 4 – Japan project and timelines Q4 2015 ER 600MW to be connected in Japan through 2017 March 2016 56.2MW to be connected in 2016 363 connected in 2017 the remainder of the 600MW pushed out to 2020 Q2 ER 2016 44MW connected in 2016 106MW in 2017 576MW total with the remainder pushed to 2022. Lie #5 Project worth Pipeline of Recurrent was worth 2.5B Pipeline of projects was worth $2.20/watt Current projects adjusted to $1.80/watt Future projects to added to pipeline value $1.40. Big Big Big disconnect on claimed valuations. I wont even go into the comments on declining gross profits that once was over 20% then 20% then 18% now 15% and I bet some are in single digit or at a loss now.
  11. What is your Jaso ASP? I have CSIQ ASP $0.56. They had 52% shipped to high ASP regions.
  12. I will be curious what they say about Japan and the projects. Based on past history, one can not rely on CSIQ Japanese project estimates. They have severely under performed in the past several years from what they claimed vs what actually happened. In this regards, they have missed guidance by 80% through 2016 from what was claimed 1 year earlier in the April 2015 presentation. They did not build to 2015 guidance nor did they build to 2016 guidance as shown in 2015. They are now several years behind their plans with only 60% of the buildout being guided as COD by the end of 2017 from what was presented in April 2015. Even the 2017 numbers of over 300MW COD are up in the air. They had already lost over 200MW of past late stage pipelines. As of Q116 they only had 200MW with signed connection agreements and had only 109MW in construction. They have indicated they are waiting on a new Japanese Meti review that could put more projects at risk of not being built. The 600MW identified from the 2015 April ER that that was to be completed by the end of 2017, has now changed be completed by the end of 2020. That is now 100MW per year on average or half what was initially planned so far. Yes there have been many reasons given as to why the targets have shifted or missed, but the facts are still the regarding backlog build in process and current guidance.
  13. If history tells us anything, anytime a FIT is about to be reduced there is always a rush to beat the deadline. China demand is not expected to continue at the current pace after June.
  14. Good luck. It may be pricey in California right now but San Diego is a beautiful area and a great place to park money in property. That market may dip some from here but will be one of the first to bounce back and climb. My uncle retired from the Navy and lived in LaJolla for 30 years. I used to jet ski on Mission Bay when I was visiting.
  15. The model is not overly complicated. Figure total cash generation from the assets over a 35 year estimation less debt and interest and opex to get total cash generation from the assets for distributions. Then If this cash generation of assets is greater than expected rate of returns in equity investments + the equity invested then that is the price needed. So where is this price? UBS suggests it is at $11, By my estimates $11/share at 5% dividend should return $20.65 over 35 years including the initial equity of $11. At a purchase of $1.75/watt one can buy 6.28watts per share at $11. That is close to the wattage per share as of today. Debt service estimated on that wattage is $7.82 over 20 years with existing debt and draws on credit lines expected.. That wattage can generate ~$30 over 35 years at a PPA of $0.10 and @ a 90% for future cash. Opex at 5% of revenue is $1.50. Total cash generation required over 35 years = 20.65+7.82++ 1.50=$29.97. The $11 based on future cash flows and dividend payouts looks about right for current assets.
  16. Termination of the Merger Agreement SunEdison and Vivint Solar may mutually agree to terminate the Merger Agreement at any time prior to the Effective Time. Either company may also terminate the Merger Agreement under the following circumstances: • if the Merger is not consummated by March 18, 2016; provided that the right to terminate the Merger Agreement under this provision will not be available to any party (i) whose failure to fulfill any of its obligations under the Merger Agreement has been a principal cause of the failure of the Merger to occur on or before March 18, 2016 or (ii) against which any legal proceeding is brought by a party to the Merger Agreement for specific performance or injunction in connection with the Merger Agreement (such prohibition on such party’s right to terminate the Merger Agreement will through the pendency of such legal proceeding); • if any law or order of any governmental authority of competent jurisdiction restraining, enjoining or otherwise prohibiting or making illegal the consummation of the Merger has become final and non-appealable; provided that the right to terminate the Merger Agreement under this provision shall not be available to any party whose failure to comply with its obligations under the Merger Agreement has been a principal cause of the imposition of such law or order
  17. http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1607716/000119312515409999/d107981dprem14a.htm Page 149 "Effect of Termination" Notice states that all certificates to be delivered by Vivint Solar at closing of the Merger will be so delivered and that Vivint Solar is ready, willing and able to consummate the Merger and (i) SunEdison and Merger Sub subsequently fail to consummate the Merger when required pursuant to the Merger Agreement (regardless of whether SunEdison or Merger Sub has obtained or received the proceeds of the Term Facility) and (ii) Vivint Solar obtains an order or decision from a court of competent jurisdiction (in compliance with the requirements of the Merger Agreement) that such failure to consummate the Merger constituted a breach of their contractual obligation to consummate the Merger or Vivint Solar obtains an order of specific performance directing SunEdison and Merger Sub to consummate the Merger, then the definition of Cash Consideration (as used in the Merger Agreement) shall be automatically increased by $2.00 (such that Cash Consideration in the Merger Agreement will equal $9.89, which was the meaning of “Cash Consideration” in the original Merger Agreement, and the amount of Additional Stock Consideration shall automatically, without any further action by any party, be deemed to be zero.